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I'm afraid I can't apply moral judgement to a stove, mate. Can you? Yet again, you're removing the concepts of my moral system from the real world situations in which is is genuinely applicable. Cookers don't have morals.
Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable, and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. It's unpleasant. Painful. Violating. Hurtful. Negative. Unsatisfactory.
It's not abstract to feel pain and I am not abstracting the idea of suffering from the context of my moral beliefs by asserting that suffering is bad because it's unpleasant. Abstract means 'considering something theoretically as removed from inderdependency or not having existence'. In fact, it's very much the opposite of abstract to say that pain hurts; it's a real world occurence. The philossophy I'm talking about (the one you're refuting) does not (and cannot) abstract the idea of suffering from its own principles; that would be, well, strange.
Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable, and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. It's unpleasant. Painful. Violating. Hurtful. Negative. Unsatisfactory.
It's not abstract to feel pain and I am not abstracting the idea of suffering from the context of my moral beliefs by asserting that suffering is bad because it's unpleasant. Abstract means 'considering something theoretically as removed from inderdependency or not having existence'. In fact, it's very much the opposite of abstract to say that pain hurts; it's a real world occurence. The philossophy I'm talking about (the one you're refuting) does not (and cannot) abstract the idea of suffering from its own principles; that would be, well, strange.
I guess we'll just have to disagree if you think that is inalienable. By the way, putting your hand on the stove is about as real-world as it gets!
The comment regarding the stove isn't about moral judgement, it's about how physical suffering is a response to interactions that would damage us. It's about the nature of suffering, and it's relevant because when you say it's some sort of inalienable truth that suffering is bad that applies to all instances of suffering.
Pain provides an impulse to avoid similar situations. It prompts us to protect body parts when they are vulnerable and healing. It lets you know when you need to take in nutrients to keep your body operating. In short: it is the body doing what it takes to keep you alive and functioning.
I put my hand on the stove, but before I receive third degree burns that might require serious medical attention I manage to withdraw due to the response my nervous system sends my brain. Did I suffer? Yes. Was it bad in itself that I suffered? No - it was incredibly beneficial, and it preserved my body's functions. Suffering is bad by implication in the event, in which the actual "bad" thing is the damage to my hand.
Whether putting my hand on the stove or being punched viciously in the stomach, the suffering is bad for precisely the same reason - it's an indication that something bad is happening, it isn't necessarily the bad thing in itself.
The comment regarding the stove isn't about moral judgement, it's about how physical suffering is a response to interactions that would damage us. It's about the nature of suffering, and it's relevant because when you say it's some sort of inalienable truth that suffering is bad that applies to all instances of suffering.
Pain provides an impulse to avoid similar situations. It prompts us to protect body parts when they are vulnerable and healing. It lets you know when you need to take in nutrients to keep your body operating. In short: it is the body doing what it takes to keep you alive and functioning.
I put my hand on the stove, but before I receive third degree burns that might require serious medical attention I manage to withdraw due to the response my nervous system sends my brain. Did I suffer? Yes. Was it bad in itself that I suffered? No - it was incredibly beneficial, and it preserved my body's functions. Suffering is bad by implication in the event, in which the actual "bad" thing is the damage to my hand.
Whether putting my hand on the stove or being punched viciously in the stomach, the suffering is bad for precisely the same reason - it's an indication that something bad is happening, it isn't necessarily the bad thing in itself.
"...because we feel it is the right thing to do."
Yes, starting to sound like faith, there, to me... If indeed there is a 'right' that is beyond each person's opinion...
Yes also, I agree that passing on more genes is how evolution works... of course, it doesn't matter if your genes are passed on through rape or something, as long as they're passed on...
Should we act on everything that's built into us?
(I'm not familiar with the gorilla story, but it sounds good)
Yes, starting to sound like faith, there, to me... If indeed there is a 'right' that is beyond each person's opinion...
Yes also, I agree that passing on more genes is how evolution works... of course, it doesn't matter if your genes are passed on through rape or something, as long as they're passed on...
Should we act on everything that's built into us?
(I'm not familiar with the gorilla story, but it sounds good)
"saying one is as justifiable as the other because of the outcome itself..."
I understood the goal of your moral system to be the reduction of suffering... so, something that greatly reduces suffering, ends it, in fact, would be an excellent moral act.
"Everybody has a level of restraint; everybody. Even the Hitlers and the Stalins had a level of restraint."
Were we talking about restraint? If I remember right, we were talking about whether everybody has a desire to reduce the suffering of others.
"...only looks at the outcome not taking into account human will, emotion, empathy or survival instinct..."
Why would we pay attention to those if the only goal is the reduction of suffering?
So, it sounds like the means are very important to you... what is the standard by which you decide which means are moral and which aren't?
I understood the goal of your moral system to be the reduction of suffering... so, something that greatly reduces suffering, ends it, in fact, would be an excellent moral act.
"Everybody has a level of restraint; everybody. Even the Hitlers and the Stalins had a level of restraint."
Were we talking about restraint? If I remember right, we were talking about whether everybody has a desire to reduce the suffering of others.
"...only looks at the outcome not taking into account human will, emotion, empathy or survival instinct..."
Why would we pay attention to those if the only goal is the reduction of suffering?
So, it sounds like the means are very important to you... what is the standard by which you decide which means are moral and which aren't?
John Calvin continues...
These Scriptures are approximately 2700-3000 years old with David's Psalm being older but both remain prophetic of the future:
The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. - Psalm 110:5
The Spirit of the Lord GOD is upon me;
Because the LORD hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek;
He hath sent me to bind up the brokenhearted,
To proclaim liberty to the captives,
And the opening of the prison to them that are bound;
To proclaim the acceptable year of the LORD,
And the day of vengeance of our God...Isaiah 61:1-2
The Great Day of God's wrath and vengeance has been prophesied since at least 2900 years ago. God has been merciful and patient. The Great Day is not here yet.
These Scriptures are approximately 2700-3000 years old with David's Psalm being older but both remain prophetic of the future:
The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. - Psalm 110:5
The Spirit of the Lord GOD is upon me;
Because the LORD hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek;
He hath sent me to bind up the brokenhearted,
To proclaim liberty to the captives,
And the opening of the prison to them that are bound;
To proclaim the acceptable year of the LORD,
And the day of vengeance of our God...Isaiah 61:1-2
The Great Day of God's wrath and vengeance has been prophesied since at least 2900 years ago. God has been merciful and patient. The Great Day is not here yet.
"It's a good thing..."
Yes, good and bad are moral issues... what is good and bad is a matter of one's own opinion... while you might not want to be harmed, someone else might want to harm you... and from their perspective it's the right thing to do...
I read on the old 'agnostic mom' blog (not sure how many people have heard of that) someone saying that good and bad, good and evil, right and wrong, are religious terms... kind of like justification, rightousness, atonement... made a lot of sense to me... they certainly aren't 'science' terms, imo...
Yes, good and bad are moral issues... what is good and bad is a matter of one's own opinion... while you might not want to be harmed, someone else might want to harm you... and from their perspective it's the right thing to do...
I read on the old 'agnostic mom' blog (not sure how many people have heard of that) someone saying that good and bad, good and evil, right and wrong, are religious terms... kind of like justification, rightousness, atonement... made a lot of sense to me... they certainly aren't 'science' terms, imo...
Except that I don't see this feeling as coming from beyond myself. It is something I am imposing based upon my cultural upbringing.
I don't think there is. It is a cultural belief on my part that we should apply the Golden Rule, and permit empathy for others to guide our actions. Look at the motto of the Western medical practitioner: do no harm. This is not the motto of radical Islamists who are being guided by their interpretation of the Koran. Morality is imposed by culture, but at the base primate level we see that it even functions among apes, for in their actions we can see much of ourselves.
That would be true if you are Genghis Khan, but in the West we impose legal systems that have been established to protect the rule of law. So obviously that answers your latter comment.
I don't think there is. It is a cultural belief on my part that we should apply the Golden Rule, and permit empathy for others to guide our actions. Look at the motto of the Western medical practitioner: do no harm. This is not the motto of radical Islamists who are being guided by their interpretation of the Koran. Morality is imposed by culture, but at the base primate level we see that it even functions among apes, for in their actions we can see much of ourselves.
That would be true if you are Genghis Khan, but in the West we impose legal systems that have been established to protect the rule of law. So obviously that answers your latter comment.
Context. Unconsensual suffering in a moral context requires that there be human beings who either inflict or suffer said suffering. Stoves are not humans. My assertion was that suffering is bad when iflicted unconsensually by humans, and it is bad because it is unpleasant and to inflict said suffering maliciously is hypocritical in that one inflicting unconsensual suffering would not like to be inflicted with it.
Okay.
It was bad in that it was unpleasant, not in that it warned you away from burning yourself further. But this is a discussion about moral ethics based on the human infliction of unconsensual suffering. Again, stoves aren't human.
Which is precisely why I've talked about not abstracting things from the context in which I proposed them. This is a discussion about morality. Morality cannot apply to inanimate objects. A moral system based on my ideas of not inflicting unconsensual suffering must by its definition as a form of human morality be a system contextualized by human interaction with other humans.
Okay.
It was bad in that it was unpleasant, not in that it warned you away from burning yourself further. But this is a discussion about moral ethics based on the human infliction of unconsensual suffering. Again, stoves aren't human.
Which is precisely why I've talked about not abstracting things from the context in which I proposed them. This is a discussion about morality. Morality cannot apply to inanimate objects. A moral system based on my ideas of not inflicting unconsensual suffering must by its definition as a form of human morality be a system contextualized by human interaction with other humans.
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Your assertion was that suffering is bad for the sufferer. If you say inflicted suffering is bad on the basis that it is "unpleasant," that would seem to imply that suffering inflicted by inanimate objects is similarly "bad" according to this line of reasoning - burns are every bit as unpleasant whether inflicted by a human or by a hot stove.
Unpleasant things are not necessarily bad for you. It may very well be good that people have unpleasant experiences. There is no equivalence here.
Unpleasant things are not necessarily bad for you. It may very well be good that people have unpleasant experiences. There is no equivalence here.
Essentially I think it boils down to this:
You maintain that suffering is "bad because nobody likes it." I'm saying nobody likes it because it is bad - or more specifically, it is a biological indicator of something else that is bad, and it prompts us to avoid such behavior in future.
Same with pleasure - someone might maintain that pleasure is "good because everybody likes it." I would instead say that everybody likes it because it is good - or more specifically, it is an indicator of something else that is good, and it prompts us to engage in such behavior in the future.
Recall your earlier statement regarding hunger:
Yes, many people do this, but if a well thought-out answer to the question "why do I eat food?" amounts to "because I am hungry" that demonstrates an understanding of one's actions that is based on appetite and instinct rather than reason and an understanding of bodily need - i.e. it amounts to founding one's actions on sensation rather than intellect. It's moving one step back to grasp what is immediately obvious to the senses instead of actually understanding the ultimate purpose of the activity.
You maintain that suffering is "bad because nobody likes it." I'm saying nobody likes it because it is bad - or more specifically, it is a biological indicator of something else that is bad, and it prompts us to avoid such behavior in future.
Same with pleasure - someone might maintain that pleasure is "good because everybody likes it." I would instead say that everybody likes it because it is good - or more specifically, it is an indicator of something else that is good, and it prompts us to engage in such behavior in the future.
Recall your earlier statement regarding hunger:
Yes, many people do this, but if a well thought-out answer to the question "why do I eat food?" amounts to "because I am hungry" that demonstrates an understanding of one's actions that is based on appetite and instinct rather than reason and an understanding of bodily need - i.e. it amounts to founding one's actions on sensation rather than intellect. It's moving one step back to grasp what is immediately obvious to the senses instead of actually understanding the ultimate purpose of the activity.
And regarding your statement about the Bible... My point is not that empathy isn't a key element in moral behavior, but that such moral virtues are objective as opposed to the wider contention that morality is subjective and dependent upon cultural opinions.
I don't deduce any moral conclusions from the Bible, but rather from a convertibility of Being and Goodness. If I say "this is a good toaster" I am basing that statement on an understanding of what toasters are. If I said "he is a good marksman" I am basing that statement on an understanding of what marksmen are. "Good" - ἀρετή - is simply meant as that particular kind of excellence.
Similarly, if I understand what a thing is then I can also understand what properties are conducive to its being. Good eyesight, fast reflexes, and a steady hand are properties which are considered virtuous when talking about what properties make an excellent marksman. I would hardly think that it is my or anyone else's subjective opinion to say that excellent snipers ought to have good eyesight - rather, it is a judgment rooted in understanding what the object in question actually is.
If I were to start with the supposition that humans are social creatures that live in society and render one another mutual assistance, then it would seem rather obvious that empathy is a characteristic that properly belongs to them - it's a moral virtue. I think it is possible to make objective judgments about what constitutes a "good person" much in the same way that one would make judgments about any other being (obviously the main difficulty being the attempt to define what people actually are).
It should also come as no surprise that it's possible to frequently make judgments about what constitutes "bad" - namely the lack of the virtues we would expect of an excellent instance of that being. Again, I don't really think this is subjective - quite the opposite. It isn't my cultural upbringing that makes me think "blind men usually make bad snipers" - it's an objective judgment based on understanding what the object in question is, what it does, and what properties are conducive towards that end.
Hopefully that makes a bit more sense now that I've clearly identified myself as anti-Ockham's divine command theory.
I don't deduce any moral conclusions from the Bible, but rather from a convertibility of Being and Goodness. If I say "this is a good toaster" I am basing that statement on an understanding of what toasters are. If I said "he is a good marksman" I am basing that statement on an understanding of what marksmen are. "Good" - ἀρετή - is simply meant as that particular kind of excellence.
Similarly, if I understand what a thing is then I can also understand what properties are conducive to its being. Good eyesight, fast reflexes, and a steady hand are properties which are considered virtuous when talking about what properties make an excellent marksman. I would hardly think that it is my or anyone else's subjective opinion to say that excellent snipers ought to have good eyesight - rather, it is a judgment rooted in understanding what the object in question actually is.
If I were to start with the supposition that humans are social creatures that live in society and render one another mutual assistance, then it would seem rather obvious that empathy is a characteristic that properly belongs to them - it's a moral virtue. I think it is possible to make objective judgments about what constitutes a "good person" much in the same way that one would make judgments about any other being (obviously the main difficulty being the attempt to define what people actually are).
It should also come as no surprise that it's possible to frequently make judgments about what constitutes "bad" - namely the lack of the virtues we would expect of an excellent instance of that being. Again, I don't really think this is subjective - quite the opposite. It isn't my cultural upbringing that makes me think "blind men usually make bad snipers" - it's an objective judgment based on understanding what the object in question is, what it does, and what properties are conducive towards that end.
Hopefully that makes a bit more sense now that I've clearly identified myself as anti-Ockham's divine command theory.
My assertion was asserted in the context of human morality and human interaction. Reducing inflicted unconsensual suffering at the hands of human beings is the premise. Inanimate objects cannot be subject to moral codes, so it really isn't fair to apply the premise of suffering uncontextually to interaction with inanimate objects. Burns are unpleasant nomatter the circumstance, yes, that's why inflicting unconsensual suffering on another human being is something I consider immoral.
Morality is to do with principles of conduct concerning others. It is not logical to equate instances of suffering by cause of inanimate objects (hot stove) as a refutation to my assertion that unconsensually inflicted suffering is morally wrong, because one cannot apply moral context to inanimate objects. They don't have moralities! lol.
'Unpelasant things' is not what Im talking about ... I'm talking about unpleasant suffering in a human moral context. Yes, it might be considered good (as in, beneficial in some way) to learn that touching a hot stove leads to physical injury, in that it deters someone from causing themselves physical injury, but such can't be 'good' morally because morality doesn't apply to inanimate objects, since morality is, again, by definition to do with human principles of conduct regarding other people.
Morality is to do with principles of conduct concerning others. It is not logical to equate instances of suffering by cause of inanimate objects (hot stove) as a refutation to my assertion that unconsensually inflicted suffering is morally wrong, because one cannot apply moral context to inanimate objects. They don't have moralities! lol.
'Unpelasant things' is not what Im talking about ... I'm talking about unpleasant suffering in a human moral context. Yes, it might be considered good (as in, beneficial in some way) to learn that touching a hot stove leads to physical injury, in that it deters someone from causing themselves physical injury, but such can't be 'good' morally because morality doesn't apply to inanimate objects, since morality is, again, by definition to do with human principles of conduct regarding other people.
Basing the argument 'morality is objective' on cited contexts in which there are no moral implications (the context of a sniper being a 'good sniper' doesn't have a moral subtext) doesn't prove morality is objective.
It is possible to consider a moral judgement objective, but that doesn't mean that it is. If I say ''that man's a good man, he did as God commands and stoned his adulterous wife'' I could consider that a genuine moral judgement; he is good because he did x. But the basis for that judgement (God says so, the killing was lawful, the man did as God asked) is a personally held conviction based on personal interpretation of the world and things within it (bible, social justice etc), and that's where the judgement ultimately derives from - the conscious mind. Me, myself, I'd look at the stoning and believe it wasn't good whatsoever; I'd believe it was barbaric and wrong, and just the same, that comes from my own moral foundations, my own conditioning, my own cognition, my own colour of perception and my own moral ethical standards. We can objectify a thing (the instance of stoning) in that it is viewed, but any moral conclusion drawn thereof cannot by its very process of deduction (dependent on personal opinion) be objective.
Being a skilled sniper has again, no moral subtext. If you're going to argue morality is objective, give me an instance of actual moral deduction that is objective. It might be morally excellent to some to throw acid in the face of people who don't dress in a way we consider modest. To others, it's vile and disgusting. And the only standard on which any opinion is ultimately derived is the cognitive interpretation of events in comparison with the personal bases for moral considerations.
The reason morality can't be objective is actually very, very simple. If morality were truly objective (not subject to individual personal opinion, bias or emotion) then everybody would have the same moral standards derived in the same mental processes. But we don't.
It is possible to consider a moral judgement objective, but that doesn't mean that it is. If I say ''that man's a good man, he did as God commands and stoned his adulterous wife'' I could consider that a genuine moral judgement; he is good because he did x. But the basis for that judgement (God says so, the killing was lawful, the man did as God asked) is a personally held conviction based on personal interpretation of the world and things within it (bible, social justice etc), and that's where the judgement ultimately derives from - the conscious mind. Me, myself, I'd look at the stoning and believe it wasn't good whatsoever; I'd believe it was barbaric and wrong, and just the same, that comes from my own moral foundations, my own conditioning, my own cognition, my own colour of perception and my own moral ethical standards. We can objectify a thing (the instance of stoning) in that it is viewed, but any moral conclusion drawn thereof cannot by its very process of deduction (dependent on personal opinion) be objective.
Being a skilled sniper has again, no moral subtext. If you're going to argue morality is objective, give me an instance of actual moral deduction that is objective. It might be morally excellent to some to throw acid in the face of people who don't dress in a way we consider modest. To others, it's vile and disgusting. And the only standard on which any opinion is ultimately derived is the cognitive interpretation of events in comparison with the personal bases for moral considerations.
The reason morality can't be objective is actually very, very simple. If morality were truly objective (not subject to individual personal opinion, bias or emotion) then everybody would have the same moral standards derived in the same mental processes. But we don't.
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It isn't a refutation of your assertion that unconsensually inflicted suffering is morally wrong, it's a refutation of your assertion that suffering is always bad for the sufferer. You said:
"Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable (claim 1), and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. (claim 2)"
If claim 1 serves as the basis for claim 2, then it would seem as though they aren't one in the same as they aren't logically identical. The stove example is directed towards claim #1, which is an absolute statement about suffering itself rather than specifically oriented towards human-inflicted suffering.
Overall, your entire argument is still a non-sequitur. Yes, we know that you don't want to suffer without giving consent. Yes, we know that other people don't want to suffer without consent either. We know that you can understand this because you are capable of empathizing with others.
No valid logical link has been presented that would direct us towards a conclusion stating that one ought not to inflict suffering on others without their consent other than your own subjective desires. You said that "[f]rom that empathy, comes a desire to alleviate or reduce physical suffering in another individual as it arises, as well as a desire not to actively cause suffering in another individual." You're missing some sort of premise such as "one ought to fulfill the desire that comes from empathy."
You have an urge to help people based on empathy - your capacity to understand their feelings? Cool story - some people have an incredible urge control, torture, and murder other human beings. What exactly makes the fulfillment of your desire moral, and theirs not moral? Is there anything that would make your deduction superior to their own?
"Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable (claim 1), and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. (claim 2)"
If claim 1 serves as the basis for claim 2, then it would seem as though they aren't one in the same as they aren't logically identical. The stove example is directed towards claim #1, which is an absolute statement about suffering itself rather than specifically oriented towards human-inflicted suffering.
Overall, your entire argument is still a non-sequitur. Yes, we know that you don't want to suffer without giving consent. Yes, we know that other people don't want to suffer without consent either. We know that you can understand this because you are capable of empathizing with others.
No valid logical link has been presented that would direct us towards a conclusion stating that one ought not to inflict suffering on others without their consent other than your own subjective desires. You said that "[f]rom that empathy, comes a desire to alleviate or reduce physical suffering in another individual as it arises, as well as a desire not to actively cause suffering in another individual." You're missing some sort of premise such as "one ought to fulfill the desire that comes from empathy."
You have an urge to help people based on empathy - your capacity to understand their feelings? Cool story - some people have an incredible urge control, torture, and murder other human beings. What exactly makes the fulfillment of your desire moral, and theirs not moral? Is there anything that would make your deduction superior to their own?
The argument for the objectivity of moral virtues isn't based on saying that good eyesight is good for being a sniper. Rather, that simply serves as a convenient example. It's an analogy dealing with the wider ontological view of the Good; moral virtue is simply one kind of goodness particular to certain types of beings (such as humans). The virtues appropriate to a "good sniper" (non-moral) and the virtues appropriate to a "good person" (moral) are completely different, but they are derived from the same ontological definition.
"Moral virtue" is concerned with being a good person, akin to how "physical virtue" is concerned with being a good athlete. The example of the sniper is simply there to illustrate how the general understanding of the Good applies in a variety of settings - including moral virtue.
Here's a sample moral deduction (obviously "good virtues" is redundant, but I put it that way for clarity):
1. Properties which are conducive to the excellence of any given being are objectively good virtues in relation to the nature of that being;
2. Empathy is conducive to the excellence of social beings that render one another mutual assistance;
Therefore, empathy is an objectively good virtue in relation to social beings that render one another mutual assistance.
1. All X's are Y's
2. Z is an X
Therefore, Z is a Y
And a sample non-moral deduction using the same form:
1. Properties which are conducive to the excellence of any given being are objectively good virtues in relation to the nature of that being;
2. Muscular strength is conducive to the excellence of an athlete who is a competitive weight-lifter;
Therefore, muscular strength is an objectively good virtue in relation to an athletes who are competitive weight-lifters.
As for the point regarding the impossibility of objective morality from disagreement: it's possible for people to simply be drawing incorrect moral conclusions. The fact that two or more people currently disagree over the answer to a given question does not mean there is no correct answer.
"Moral virtue" is concerned with being a good person, akin to how "physical virtue" is concerned with being a good athlete. The example of the sniper is simply there to illustrate how the general understanding of the Good applies in a variety of settings - including moral virtue.
Here's a sample moral deduction (obviously "good virtues" is redundant, but I put it that way for clarity):
1. Properties which are conducive to the excellence of any given being are objectively good virtues in relation to the nature of that being;
2. Empathy is conducive to the excellence of social beings that render one another mutual assistance;
Therefore, empathy is an objectively good virtue in relation to social beings that render one another mutual assistance.
1. All X's are Y's
2. Z is an X
Therefore, Z is a Y
And a sample non-moral deduction using the same form:
1. Properties which are conducive to the excellence of any given being are objectively good virtues in relation to the nature of that being;
2. Muscular strength is conducive to the excellence of an athlete who is a competitive weight-lifter;
Therefore, muscular strength is an objectively good virtue in relation to an athletes who are competitive weight-lifters.
As for the point regarding the impossibility of objective morality from disagreement: it's possible for people to simply be drawing incorrect moral conclusions. The fact that two or more people currently disagree over the answer to a given question does not mean there is no correct answer.