Even the Soviets refused to back Iran. Too batcrap crazy.
And the Gulf States likewise thought that the real threat was Iran.
As they surely do now.
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During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), several international actors, including the Soviet Union, France, and Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, provided significant military, financial, or diplomatic support to Iraq under Saddam Hussein rather than to Iran. This alignment was driven by a combination of geopolitical fears, strategic interests, economic motivations, and ideological concerns, particularly the perceived threat posed by Iran's revolutionary Shia Islamism under Ayatollah Khomeini. Below, I'll break down the key reasons for each group's support, based on historical context.
Gulf States (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait)The Sunni Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf viewed Iran's post-1979 Islamic Revolution as an existential threat. Khomeini's regime actively promoted exporting its revolutionary ideology, which emphasized Shia empowerment and anti-monarchical sentiments, potentially inciting unrest among the Shia populations in these countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province had a significant Shia minority). A victorious Iran could dominate the Gulf region, control oil routes like the Strait of Hormuz, and destabilize their regimes. To counter this, Gulf states provided billions in financial aid to Iraq—estimated at over $30 billion from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone—to bolster Saddam's war effort and prevent Iranian expansion.
britannica.com
This support was also pragmatic: Iraq served as a buffer state against Iran, and Saddam's secular Ba'athist regime was seen as more predictable and less ideologically aggressive toward them than Khomeini's theocracy.
Soviet Union
The USSR, Iraq's primary arms supplier (providing over 90% of its weapons imports during the war), initially adopted a neutral stance and even tilted toward Iran in the early years (1980-1982) by limiting arms to Iraq and maintaining diplomatic overtures to Tehran.
en.wikipedia.org
However, as Iran made territorial gains into Iraq by 1982 and refused peace overtures, Moscow shifted decisively to support Baghdad with massive arms shipments, including tanks, aircraft, and missiles.
en.wikipedia.org
Key reasons included:
- Strategic alliance preservation: Iraq was a long-standing Soviet client state since the 1970s, with a friendship treaty in place. The USSR feared losing influence if Saddam's regime fell or pivoted fully to the West (which was also supporting Iraq).
en.wikipedia.org
- Regional stability concerns: A radical Iranian victory could destabilize the Middle East, spread Islamist unrest near Soviet borders (e.g., in Central Asia with Muslim populations), and encourage anti-Soviet movements. Supporting Iraq also helped the USSR gain favor with other Arab states, leading to new diplomatic ties (e.g., with Oman, UAE, and arms deals with Kuwait).
en.wikipedia.org
- Geopolitical balancing: The war was inconvenient for Moscow, but backing the more conciliatory side (Iraq after 1982) aligned with Soviet interests in preventing U.S. dominance in the Gulf.
merip.org
By 1986, with further Iranian advances, Soviet aid intensified to avert Iraq's collapse.
en.wikipedia.org
France
France emerged as Iraq's second-largest arms supplier after the Soviet Union, providing advanced weaponry like Mirage fighter jets, Exocet missiles, Super Etendard aircraft, and Roland air defense systems—often higher-tech than Soviet equivalents.
en.wikipedia.org
This support was primarily driven by economic interests: Arms sales to Iraq generated billions in revenue during a period of French economic challenges, with deals often including favorable loans or oil-for-arms barter arrangements. Geopolitically, France sought to counter Iran's revolutionary influence, which was seen as destabilizing to French interests in the Middle East and Africa (where Iran supported anti-colonial movements). Paris also aimed to maintain balance in the region, viewing Saddam's Iraq as a secular counterweight to Khomeini's theocracy, and aligned with broader Western efforts to contain Iran amid the U.S. hostage crisis and anti-Western rhetoric from Tehran.
britannica.com
In summary, these supporters prioritized containing Iran's revolutionary zeal over any affinity for Iraq itself, fearing that an Iranian win would reshape the Middle East in ways that threatened their security, economies, or influence. This international backing enabled Iraq's counteroffensives from 1987 onward, ultimately contributing to the war's stalemate.
