Matthew Pines
@matthew_pines
Ok, so here’s my latest take on how Bessent may be able to revalue the gold certificates w/o legislation:
Under 31 USC §5117 & the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the U.S. Treasury is authorized to issue gold certificates to the Federal Reserve Banks, backed by the gold it holds, at the statutory price of $42.22 per ounce. These gold certificates are held by the Fed and booked as assets, while the corresponding deposits credited to the Treasury General Account reflect this fixed valuation.
This statutory constraint prevents Treasury from unilaterally revaluing those certs at the market price. However, there is a path to unlock the market value of the Treasury’s gold w/o changing the official price.
This begins w/ the Treasury conducting an internal accounting revaluation of its gold reserves, marking them to market. While the statutory gold price remains unchanged, the Treasury can internally record the difference between the book value & the market value (e.g. $3200+/oz) as an unrealized revaluation surplus. This surplus would not be reflected on the Fed’s balance sheet initially, but could be recorded in an internal ledger or in the Exchange Stabilization Fund.
Next, the Treasury would exercise its authority, detailed in Federal Reserve accounting manuals (e.g., section 2.10), to demonetize a portion of the existing gold certificates by reacquiring them from the Fed. This process decreases the value of the gold certificate account and reduces the corresponding deposit credit at the FRBNY, effectively freeing the Treasury to remonetize that portion of the gold in a different form. Demonetization does not require any sale of physical gold—it is a bookkeeping maneuver authorized under current law.
With that portion of gold now demobilized from the legacy certificate system, Treasury can issue a new financial instrument—such as “Gold Reserve Receipts” or “Gold Trust Units”—that is indexed to the market price of gold. These instruments would not be classified as gold certificates under §5117 and would thus not be constrained by the statutory price. They would function as market-valued collateral or sovereign-backed instruments anchored to U.S. gold reserves but issued under different legal authority—potentially within the ESF, or under emergency law (IEPPA).
The Fed, under its broad discretion to accept various assets under Sec. 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, could then accept these new instruments on its balance sheet at market value. This is consistent with the Fed’s actions in previous crises, such as 2008 & 2020, when it accepted novel or unconventional collateral to stabilize the financial system.
In this case, the Fed could credit the Treasury’s deposit account (TGA or ESF-linked) with reserves equal to the full market value of the monetized gold instrument. This infusion of liquidity would require no debt issuance, no bond sales, and no change in the official gold price—yet it would unlock up to a $trillion in fiscal headroom.
To make this more politically and procedurally robust, Congress could pass a reconciliation bill or budget resolution instructing the CBO and OMB to recognize the market value of U.S. gold reserves as a fiscal offset. This would allow Treasury to account for the gold revaluation surplus in the federal budget without changing the statutory price or breaching the debt ceiling.
The key legal distinction here is that accounting recognition of market value is not the same as statutorily redefining the gold price.
This would require close Treasury-Fed cooperation (Bessent and Powell have weekly lunches), international heads-up (IMF Spring Meetings are next week), and semi-secrecy (leaks push gold up and increase revaluation gains…).
While its principal purpose would be to help manage the long end (“buybacks”) and create fiscal space for budget negotiations, it would also be a “budget neutral” source of funds to add to the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve… win-win-win…