Revolution in Iran
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Granular targeting must be getting awfully spooky if you are a Basij goon.....
If Tehran falls to the populists it will send the IRGC fleeing.
The Israelis Hermes 900 (Kochav in IDF service) destroys a vehicle like a car or light truck carrying Basij personnel through precision-guided munitions launched from the drone itself, rather than relying on larger standoff weapons from jets or other platforms. This fits its role as a multi-mission medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV capable of both persistent surveillance and direct tactical strikes.
How the Strike Typically Works
Detection and Targeting:The drone loiters at medium altitude (up to ~30,000 ft) for extended periods (up to 36 hours), using its advanced payloads: electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turrets with laser designators, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), ground-moving target indication (GMTI), and sometimes AI-assisted processing.
It identifies the target—e.g., a moving car or pickup truck with Basij fighters—via real-time video feeds, thermal signatures, or movement tracking. Operators (or semi-autonomous systems) confirm it's a valid military target (e.g., regime enforcers suppressing protests or coordinating responses in urban areas like Tehran).
Weapon Deployment:The Hermes 900 carries weapons on wing hardpoints and/or an internal bay, with a payload capacity of up to ~350–450 kg depending on configuration.
For a granular urban target like a car full of personnel (soft-skinned vehicle, no heavy armor), it fires air-to-surface missiles or drops small precision-guided bombs.
Common or reported armament options include:AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (laser-guided or variants; up to 4 can be carried) — These are the most likely for such a target. Hellfire is a proven anti-armor/anti-personnel missile with a ~9 kg warhead, excellent precision (CEP <1 m), and low collateral when used in urban settings. It penetrates light vehicles easily, detonating on impact or with delay fuze for maximum effect against occupants.
Laser-guided bombs like GBU-12 Paveway II (500 lb class, but smaller variants or equivalents possible) or similar Israeli munitions (e.g., Spice family kits adapted for UAVs).
In some configurations, Spike family missiles (electro-optical guided, fire-and-forget).
The drone's laser designator illuminates the target for semi-active laser-guided weapons, or it uses its own onboard guidance for GPS/INS-aided strikes.
Execution and Effect:
A single Hellfire or similar munition is typically sufficient to destroy or disable a civilian vehicle (car/SUV/pickup), killing or severely injuring occupants through blast, fragmentation, and overpressure.
The strike is highly precise to minimize unintended civilian casualties in dense urban environments—aligning with IDF rules of engagement in the current conflict phase, where drones target regime security forces (Basij patrols/checkpoints) to degrade internal control without massive bombardment.
Post-strike, the Hermes 900 can remain on station for battle damage assessment (BDA) via its sensors, cueing follow-up strikes if needed.
How the Strike Typically Works
Detection and Targeting:The drone loiters at medium altitude (up to ~30,000 ft) for extended periods (up to 36 hours), using its advanced payloads: electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turrets with laser designators, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), ground-moving target indication (GMTI), and sometimes AI-assisted processing.
It identifies the target—e.g., a moving car or pickup truck with Basij fighters—via real-time video feeds, thermal signatures, or movement tracking. Operators (or semi-autonomous systems) confirm it's a valid military target (e.g., regime enforcers suppressing protests or coordinating responses in urban areas like Tehran).
Weapon Deployment:The Hermes 900 carries weapons on wing hardpoints and/or an internal bay, with a payload capacity of up to ~350–450 kg depending on configuration.
For a granular urban target like a car full of personnel (soft-skinned vehicle, no heavy armor), it fires air-to-surface missiles or drops small precision-guided bombs.
Common or reported armament options include:AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (laser-guided or variants; up to 4 can be carried) — These are the most likely for such a target. Hellfire is a proven anti-armor/anti-personnel missile with a ~9 kg warhead, excellent precision (CEP <1 m), and low collateral when used in urban settings. It penetrates light vehicles easily, detonating on impact or with delay fuze for maximum effect against occupants.
Laser-guided bombs like GBU-12 Paveway II (500 lb class, but smaller variants or equivalents possible) or similar Israeli munitions (e.g., Spice family kits adapted for UAVs).
In some configurations, Spike family missiles (electro-optical guided, fire-and-forget).
The drone's laser designator illuminates the target for semi-active laser-guided weapons, or it uses its own onboard guidance for GPS/INS-aided strikes.
Execution and Effect:
A single Hellfire or similar munition is typically sufficient to destroy or disable a civilian vehicle (car/SUV/pickup), killing or severely injuring occupants through blast, fragmentation, and overpressure.
The strike is highly precise to minimize unintended civilian casualties in dense urban environments—aligning with IDF rules of engagement in the current conflict phase, where drones target regime security forces (Basij patrols/checkpoints) to degrade internal control without massive bombardment.
Post-strike, the Hermes 900 can remain on station for battle damage assessment (BDA) via its sensors, cueing follow-up strikes if needed.
By hitting so many countries it increases the land area for the "iron dome" to protect and they have to send interceptors to all those countries, spreading the stockpile. Also, Iran has a much higher success rate hitting oil targets in nations along the strait of Hormuz and that in turn is a big hit on the world's economy.
This proves that Iran realizes those interceptors are effective at knocking their missiles out of the sky and that it is very hard for them to do any real damage to Israel up to this point.
However, by waiting for the interceptors to be depleted they gave the US and Israel a chance to go after their "missile cities" where the ultimate ICBMs for Israel are supposed to be fired from. The B2 bombers are dropping MOABs on them.
What are they going to do? The Houthis wiped the floor with the Saudis, which means the Saudis aren't much of a fighting force. No Gulf state air field will be safe. Many if not most Gulf state fighter pilots are contracted foreigners. The Kuwaiti F-18 that shot down 3 Kuwaiti F-15s was piloted by an American, I think.
"Iran is increasing its oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz despite the ongoing war, while Gulf Arab countries reduce production. Since February 28, Iran has loaded an average of 2.1 million barrels daily, surpassing February's figures. "
www.disclose.tv
Iran is exporting more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than before the war
Breaking news from around the world.
www.disclose.tv
You're correct that no single country "owns" the sea lanes in the Strait of Hormuz or the broader Persian Gulf in the sense of exclusive sovereignty over international shipping routes. These are vital international waterways, and international law strongly protects freedom of navigation through them, particularly for commercial vessels.The Strait of Hormuz is narrow (about 21 nautical miles at its tightest point), so its waters fall within the territorial seas of Iran (to the north) and Oman (to the south). Under the widely accepted framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—which reflects customary international law in many respects—straits used for international navigation like this one are subject to a transit passage regime. This grants ships and aircraft the right to continuous and expeditious passage without interference or suspension by the coastal states (Articles 37–44 of UNCLOS). Coastal states cannot hamper or suspend this transit passage, though they can regulate for safety, pollution prevention, etc.Iran signed but never ratified UNCLOS, and it has historically argued for a more limited "innocent passage" regime (which allows greater coastal state control and can theoretically be suspended in some cases). However, even under that view—or under pre-UNCLOS customary law—the kind of actions described (deliberate attacks on neutral commercial tankers using drones/USVs, heavy damage to vessels, and effective disruption/blocking of transit) go far beyond any legitimate regulatory authority. These constitute unlawful interference with freedom of navigation, attacks on neutral shipping, and likely violations of:The prohibition on the use of force against another state's vessels (UN Charter Article 2(4)).
Protections for neutral merchant shipping during armed conflict (customary law of naval warfare, reflected in documents like the San Remo Manual).
Broader principles against endangering civilian lives and global commerce.
Recent UN Security Council resolutions and statements (e.g., condemning Iran's actions as breaches of international law and threats to peace/security) have explicitly criticized interference with navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and related attacks. Many sources describe these specific incidents as clear violations, especially since they target third-party commercial traffic not directly involved in hostilities.Iran does exercise sovereignty over its side of the territorial waters (up to ~12 nautical miles from its coast), but that doesn't extend to "owning" the entire strait or the right to blockade or attack international shipping lanes. The current disruptions—stranding tankers, halting massive oil exports, and raising global prices—are precisely why such actions are seen as illegitimate under international norms.In short: You're right—no one owns those sea lanes in a way that permits this kind of interference. The attacks appear to violate established maritime law and freedom of navigation principles that most of the world (including major powers) upholds.
Protections for neutral merchant shipping during armed conflict (customary law of naval warfare, reflected in documents like the San Remo Manual).
Broader principles against endangering civilian lives and global commerce.
Recent UN Security Council resolutions and statements (e.g., condemning Iran's actions as breaches of international law and threats to peace/security) have explicitly criticized interference with navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and related attacks. Many sources describe these specific incidents as clear violations, especially since they target third-party commercial traffic not directly involved in hostilities.Iran does exercise sovereignty over its side of the territorial waters (up to ~12 nautical miles from its coast), but that doesn't extend to "owning" the entire strait or the right to blockade or attack international shipping lanes. The current disruptions—stranding tankers, halting massive oil exports, and raising global prices—are precisely why such actions are seen as illegitimate under international norms.In short: You're right—no one owns those sea lanes in a way that permits this kind of interference. The attacks appear to violate established maritime law and freedom of navigation principles that most of the world (including major powers) upholds.
International Responses and CoalitionsThere's already momentum toward collective action, though it's complex due to geopolitical divisions:
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Coalition: The six GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) have formed a "Gulf coalition" in response to Iranian strikes on their territories.
@lizbert114
They've threatened retaliatory measures under collective security frameworks and called for Iran to halt attacks to stabilize energy markets.
eadaily.com
Saudi Arabia, in particular, has pledged to use its capabilities against Tehran.
@lizbert114
This aligns with U.S. and Israeli strikes, and Reuters reports that Iranian actions could push more Gulf states into a broader U.S.-aligned coalition, potentially widening the conflict.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Coalition: The six GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) have formed a "Gulf coalition" in response to Iranian strikes on their territories.
@lizbert114
They've threatened retaliatory measures under collective security frameworks and called for Iran to halt attacks to stabilize energy markets.
eadaily.com
Saudi Arabia, in particular, has pledged to use its capabilities against Tehran.
@lizbert114
This aligns with U.S. and Israeli strikes, and Reuters reports that Iranian actions could push more Gulf states into a broader U.S.-aligned coalition, potentially widening the conflict.