It can be beneficial in many ways, to both the person inflicting the suffering and the person sustaining it. There are many instances in which suffering is necessary to obtain a good (or avert an evil), and there are also cases in which people are unable to give consent. For instance, if a surgeon were to perform a painful yet necessary operation on the sole infant survivor of an orphanage fire, that might be said to be "inflicting suffering without prior consent."
You, like others, are compartmentalizing motive, means and outcome. But they are inter-related and in my moral perspective interdependent. You're implying that a surgeon performing a painful surgery (motive being to help someone who has been in an accident live) can be morally equivalent to someone murdering, raping and pillaging (which was the context in which I asked the question you replied to) without the consent of victims. That is grossly erroneous.
As for suffering being necessary to avert an evil, I can understand and even condone it in matters of self-defense if a person so wishes to defend themselves by inflicting suffering upon another person (since the defender never gave his consent to be attacked, obviously), but in other cases it becomes a matter of trying to predict the future and torturing others to potentially save others and becomes awfully messy and risky. In my opinion, the latter isn't justifiable simply because the probability of outcome cannot be calculated; it is inflicting intense suffering for wishful thinking.
It isn't a failure to empathize per se, but rather a recognition that placing emphasis on suffering itself in a moral system ultimately places the cart before the horse. Do you think it would make more sense to consider actual well-being as an appropriate metric as opposed to suffering (or pleasure)?
I don't necissarily agree that focusing on suffering is looking at things the wrong way round. ''Well-being'' is wooly. The deaths of a few million contributed to Stalin's mental well being (in that he didn't have to then deal with having those potential detractors running around fuelling his paranoia), but that came at the cost of millions of lives, and at grave suffering to the victims. The basic idea here is personal empathy regarding suffering. I do not like to suffer unconsensually, therefore I should not endeavour to make others suffer unconsensually. Obviously, motivations play a role in this too. What I should have said is that I should not cause others to suffer unconsensually where my motivations are maliceful in any way towards the individual upon whom I would inflict suffering (and that's important, because it removes the loophole to 'torture people for good ol' USA').
If I cause an individual to suffer, in the brilliant example you mentioned of a surgeon performing a surgery, say without anaesthetic since there is not any at hand (war-zone medic perhaps) then this is motivated by a desire to save that individual's life. Malicefully inflicting suffering by some imagined merit based on uncalculable predictions (he might give us information that'll save who knows how many lives, or he might know nothing whatsoever) is not the same. Neither is, of course, raping and pillaging.
I suppose we can surmise now that these are the personal criteria for the moral system I live by:
1. Empathy in regards to suffering. By my estimation, I do not like to suffer unconsensually, thus others do not like to suffer unconsensually.
2. From that empathy, comes a desire to alleviate or reduce physical suffering in another individual as it arises, as well as a desire not to actively cause suffering in another individual. It is impossible to reduce present existent suffering in a particular individual by the infliction of present suffering on that individual, nor is it logical to reduce suffering by contradicting their survivial instincts as understood by my own (I want to live, thus killing everyone to reduce their suffering would be non empathetic).
2b. I can, however, inflict a necessary level of suffering on an individual in medical circumstances where it is absolutely the only way to help, or in the case of self-defence of oneself or of innocents, which does require a level of willingness to inflict harm. These are warranted because in empathy I know survival is important thus operating on the individual is the right course of action, and that self defense is warranted because I did not consent to being attacked, neither did innocents, however, this infliction of suffering (either in self defense or medicine) should ideally not be of a level of unnecessary force (shooting a man who attacks with his fists, for instance, or cutting off the arm when you can just pop the shoulder back in).
3. Apart from as in point 2b, I should never cause suffering in an individual to reduce suffering in them; this is oxymoronic. I do however believe in the right of painless euthanasia in circumstances where intense unbearable physical pain and suffering cannot be alleviated by any other means, as, for instance, in the case of a person with untreatable illness causing such intense agony that it cannot be helped with painkillers. (The recent case of the eight year old girl in Great Ormond Street Hospital who would scream day in night in agony regardless of the morphine given her, whose illness was incurable and for all intents and purposes untreatable).
5. Apart from in self defence, maliceful motivations must not be present in any moral endeavour in any context whatsoever.
Now, this is my morality, and I don't believe you or anybody else
has to live by this moral code, but for me, it is the one I've chosen and weighing up the options it seems the best one, to my reasoning.