It isn't a refutation of your assertion that unconsensually inflicted suffering is morally wrong, it's a refutation of your assertion that suffering is always bad for the sufferer. You said:
"Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable (claim 1), and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. (claim 2)"
"Suffering is bad to the sufferer. That is inalienable (claim 1), and that is the basis I assert for my moral belief that causing unconsensual suffering is bad. (claim 2)"
Suffering is unpleasant for the sufferer. It's not morally 'bad' for him. It's morally bad to inflict it unless benevolently because of the fact that no person likes to suffer unconsensually, due to its obviously unpleasant nature. Context. I wrote two sentences together in a paragraph because they're contextually dependent.
If claim 1 serves as the basis for claim 2, then it would seem as though they aren't one in the same as they aren't logically identical. The stove example is directed towards claim #1, which is an absolute statement about suffering itself rather than specifically oriented towards human-inflicted suffering.
Overall, your entire argument is still a non-sequitur. Yes, we know that you don't want to suffer without giving consent. Yes, we know that other people don't want to suffer without consent either. We know that you can understand this because you are capable of empathizing with others.
No valid logical link has been presented that would direct us towards a conclusion stating that one ought not to inflict suffering on others without their consent other than your own subjective desires. You said that "[f]
Overall, your entire argument is still a non-sequitur. Yes, we know that you don't want to suffer without giving consent. Yes, we know that other people don't want to suffer without consent either. We know that you can understand this because you are capable of empathizing with others.
No valid logical link has been presented that would direct us towards a conclusion stating that one ought not to inflict suffering on others without their consent other than your own subjective desires. You said that "[f]
rom that empathy, comes a desire to alleviate or reduce physical suffering in another individual as it arises, as well as a desire not to actively cause suffering in another individual." You're missing some sort of premise such as "one ought to fulfill the desire that comes from empathy."
If you inflict suffering on others without their consent, you are not a man of moral integrity. Your actions do not have solidarity with your own mental desires. If you hurt someone else against their will, then you, by right of fairness, must accept for others to hurt you against your own. Whether you fulfill the desire to act upon empathy or not will determine the solidarity of your moral choices; it will either render your moral code hypocritical and divisible or coherent and sincere. If morality is to do with human interaction, then it befits a moral consideration to me empathetic, otherwise a moral decision gives more value to the 'I' of the circumstance rather than the 'we' of the circumstance and fails to fulfill its function, which from my perspective is to make the world a place of less unnecessary sufferin -- to serve humanity for the better, to make people happy in a manner that does not come at the cost of the unhappiness of others.
You have an urge to help people based on empathy - your capacity to understand their feelings? Cool story - some people have an incredible urge control, torture, and murder other human beings. What exactly makes the fulfillment of your desire moral, and theirs not moral? Is there anything that would make your deduction superior to their own?
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